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The procedure for designating and establishing Marine Protected Areas (MPA) has changed pro-
foundly since the 1990s, as a consequence of global changes and new dictates related to biodi-
versity conservation and sustainable development. Far beyond protection of flagship species such 
as marine turtles and large marine mammals, the goal is now to conserve and even increase 
the services associated with coastal ecosystems to the benefit of all stakeholders. References 
to community management of resources, territorial solidarity, or environmental justice have be-
come common. The political processes undertaken have nevertheless taken a range of different 
trajectories, since the stakeholders (private, public, NGOs, local collectives) have different inter-
ests; their standards and rules are often incompatible; the efficacy of the negotiation process is 
debatable. In this article, after questioning the legitimacy of MPA (to what extent are they useful 
tools ? —in responding to what aims?),  the difficulties of putting into practice this new paradigm 
of participative governance is analysed and illustrated using three case studies of coastal Sen-
egalese MPAs and the consequences of local intervention: the Saint Louis MPA, the Bamboung 
Community-Managed MPA in the Saloum Delta, and the Mangagoulack ICCA (Indigenous and 
Community Conserved Area) in Casamance. In conclusion, the principal lessons and perspectives 
of these approaches are presented.
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Editors’ note: This paper is a revised version of a book chapter originally published in 
French by the IRD (Cormier-Salem, 2014, in press).
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Despite an international consensus in favour of increasing 
the number of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) and enlarging 
them (Bonnin et al., in press), controversy surrounds their 
effectiveness and legitimacy, especially in the context of 
developing countries. This is particularly true in Africa, a 
continent scarred by varying levels of conflict, ecological 
crisis, impoverishment and State disengagement (De Santo, 
2013). In terms of their ecological effectiveness, questions are 
repeatedly raised concerning the minimal size, boundaries 
and configurations of MPA (Agardy et al., 2011). In terms of 
their economic and social legitimacy, spatial and social justice 
and amenities for local communities are recurring issues 
(Potts et al., 2014; Trimble et al., 2014). According to Charles 
and Wilson (2009), it is possible to identify ten conditions that 
determine their success: attachment to place; high level of 
participation; effective governance; co-building of knowledge 
(scientific vs vernacular or local); the role of rights and 
customs; consequences of displacement of communities; 
costs and benefits; the place of the MPA in the larger region. 
On the assumption that the resilience of socio-ecosystems 
owes less to the management of resources, strictly speaking, 
than to the governance of the regions, this article will focus on 
two of the points highlighted by Charles and Wilson, namely 
effective governance and participation, and the close links 
between them. What is “good” governance? Is participation 
by the local population effective? To what extent are the local 
or indigenous people key players in the governance of MPA? 
We will study the MPA policies implemented in Senegal. After 
considering the way concepts and management of the coastal 
areas and their resources have developed—from the creation 
of sanctuaries for flagship species to the co-management of 
MPA—we will explain why we regard Senegal as a pioneer 
in the adoption of these new paradigms, before analysing 
the problems and limitations inherent in operationalising 
these models. Three case studies will be used: the Saint 
Louis MPA, the Bamboung Community-Managed MPA in the 
Saloum Delta and the Mangagoulack ICCA (Indigenous and 
Community Conserved Area) in Casamance.
Our mainly empirical methodology is based on a set of 
surveys conducted since 2005 along the West African coast, 
and Senegal in particular. Individual and group interviews 
were followed up by regular monitoring and contacts 
with Parks officials and protected areas and with local 
populations from 20091. The purpose of these surveys was 
to identify and characterise the stakeholders involved in 
governance of the coastal area and their relationships with 
one another (decision-makers, managers, users, private 
and public operators, NGOs, scientists, etc.) and to gain an 
understanding of the knowledge, practices and institutions 
mobilised in this governance (values attributed to biodiversity, 
old and new systems of access and use, informal and formal 
agreements, standards and mechanisms) as well as conflicts 
and the methods used to resolve them, focusing not only on 
heritage-related, territorial and identity-related claims, but 
also old and new systems of mutual aid and alliance. Analysis 
of this empirical body of work is supplemented by theoretical 
consideration of concepts based on a bibliographical analysis 
of various written sources (from government reports to 
scientific articles). This article will not attempt to summarise 
these, since the subject is so broad and has given rise to 
numerous scientific works (Cormier-Salem, 2006a; Weigel 
et al., 2007; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2009b; Dahou, 2010; 
Touré, 2011; Lavigne Delville, 2011; Ingold, 2014).
2. TowArdS SuSTAInAble And ShAred 
governAnce of MPA: InSTITuTIonAl 
ArTIculATIonS And coordInATIon 
beTween STAkeholderS
2.1 new PArAdIgMS
The context has changed since the first marine sanctuaries 
were created to provide integral protection for emblematic 
species. New challenges have arisen, particularly in terms 
of the concept of sustainable development, which entered 
the media spotlight after the Brundtland report and was 
formalised at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Article 8 (j) of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, concerning the problem of 
in situ conservation, recommends including consideration of 
“the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and 
local communities”. This article has been on the agenda of all 
the Party Conferences since 1996. The reference to traditional 
ecological knowledge has become an intrinsic part of 
ecologically correct discussion. It goes without saying that the 
challenges are immense: “indigenous and local communities” 
are now seen as the primary beneficiaries of shared advantages. 
Links have been officially established between local practices, 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable management, 
1  These programmes were undertaken at the IRD (Institut de Recherche pour 
le Developpement, the French Institute for Development Research, www.ird.
fr) in collaboration with the National Museum of Natural History, under the 
banner of a joint research unit (UMR) called “PALOC” (“Local heritages”, www.
paloc.fr). The programme was supported by the National Research Agency 
(ANR) for Biodiversity and the International Joint Research Laboratory (LMI) 
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joining the many social science studies which criticised 
Hardin’s theory and stressed the relevance of community 
management methods. As well as clear recognition of the 
right of communities to manage, i.e. to control the resources 
in their own region as part of a move towards governance, 
which is replacing co-management strategies (Berkes, 
1989; Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2005), cultural diversity is also 
recognised as a key aspect of biodiversity. Across the world, 
areas of megabiodiversity are often located in places where 
poor and marginalised communities live. The survival of 
these peoples and the maintenance of their practices appear 
to be essential components of diversity conservation (Posey, 
1996). Accordingly, the identity and territorial claims of these 
minorities include a recognition not only of their cultural and 
political uniqueness but also of their privileged links with their 
environment and the associated biodiversity (Cormier-Salem 
& Roussel, 2002).
The evolving nature of these issues is clearly visible in the 
area of international negotiations. Was not the fight against 
poverty also the leitmotif of the Johannesburg Sustainable 
Development World Summit in August 2002, ten years after 
the Rio Earth Summit? Calls for equity and respect for cultural 
differences have been reiterated loud and clear. We have yet 
to ensure that these are put into practice.
With the way now open for the construction of local heritages, 
a number of practical, political and ethical problems arise. 
How can we preserve migratory species that do not recognise 
national borders, such as migratory birds or schools of fish? 
We need to acknowledge the multitude of local heritages and 
create a regional network of protection areas and corridors. 
Recognising that MPA are not islands (Janzen, 1983), all 
policies endeavour to one degree or another to factor in the 
ecological and social interdependencies underpinning these 
regional projects, as well as regional solidarities (Bonnin & 
Rodary, 2008; Mathevet et al., 2010). 
Although these concepts of solidarity (ecological/social/
regional), environmental justice, shared governance, etc. are 
rapidly gaining ground, changes in standards of public action 
and particularly the level of acceptance of the MPA by local 
communities, recognition of local rules and agreements and 
the actual sharing of the advantages created as a result of 
biodiversity conservation are all open to question (see Nagoya 
Protocol; see MEA framework with reaffirmed links between 
the preservation of ecosystem services and the well-being of 
the populations; see ecotourism initiatives, promotion of local 
products, etc.).
When it comes to natural resources, in West Africa the 
pendulum has swung between centralised and decentralised, 
state and community, private, public and participatory 
management since the 1960s. Newly independent States took 
over from colonial administrations and reaffirmed ownership 
of so-called empty or common land. Since the 1980s however, 
numerous failures and conflicts caused by a lack of public 
services on the one hand and land tenure insecurity on the other 
have led to the implementation of new methods of collective 
action (Blundo, 2002; Dahou, 2010; Lavigne Delville, 2011). 
Decentralisation and deconcentration policies aim to transfer 
the management of resources to the local communities, who 
are considered to have a vested interest in their preservation 
since they depend on them for their continued existence and 
are therefore in the best position to ensure compliance with 
the rules. The co-management of protected areas meets a 
requirement not merely for economic efficiency (principle 
of subsidiarity) and political efficiency (primacy of social 
control over administrative control), but also social justice, 
restoring the rights of the communities and ensuring that 
they receive an equal share of the benefits derived from 
nature. Over and above the consideration of the territorial 
and identity claims of the local communities, governance, 
which has gone hand in hand with sustainable development 
since the 1990s, is a system of institutional articulations, 
negotiation and conflict resolution (Cormier-Salem, 2007). 
Participation in governance encompasses various concepts, 
which often overlap but are nevertheless very different in 
terms of collective decision processes, ranging from simple 
consultation to coordination and negotiation (Thouzard, 2006). 
These methods are implemented at different spatial-temporal 
levels, mobilise different players, and occur in different stages. 
These terms often slot together or succeed one another as the 
process develops. According to Mermet (2012), negotiation is “a 
decision system in which players who are interdependent but 
have different interests or views engage in dialogue in order 
to seek a mutually agreeable solution.” We will examine the 
operationality of this definition and these new models based on 
the coastal biodiversity conservation policies in place in Senegal. 
2.2 A PIoneer In MPA governAnce: SenegAl
In Senegal, as in the rest of the world, the first MPA fulfilled 
a pressing need to protect so-called heritage animal species 
included on the IUCN red lists and in several international 
conventions, such as the 1979 Bonn conventions on the 
protection of migratory species (avifauna, ichtyofauna and 
marine mammals) and the habitats that shelter them, 
mangrove swamps to the fore. The first Senegalese coastal 
areas (there are no marine areas as such) to be classified, in 
1971, were migratory bird habitats. Initially Ramsar sites, they 
later became a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (Saloum Delta 
with Bird Island in Senegal) and National Parks (Barbary Spit 
and Djoudj in the Senegal River Delta and Madeleine Island off 
Dakar) (see Figure 1) (Cormier-Salem, 2006a).
This sanctuary approach, focused on one element of 
biodiversity, was followed in the 1990s by so-called 
ecosystemic and regional approaches, “anchored in the local 
way of life” (Cormier-Salem & Roussel, 2002): in accordance 
with the Biodiversity Convention, ratified by Senegal, notably 
Article 8J concerning recognition of the knowledge and 
traditions of indigenous communities. Given the specific 
context of West Africa, where 60% of the population live 
near the coast and fishing and seaside tourism are hugely 
important, it is recognised that coastal biodiversity must be 
preserved both with and for local users. The ecoregional 
approach that developed during the 1990s appears to be 
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the most appropriate way to manage not only migratory 
species (mullet, sharks, sea turtles), but also the fishermen 
who migrate at this level. Nor should fishermen any longer 
be unilaterally regarded as predators or pillagers, but as 
responsible producers involved in the governance of their 
region.
Figure 1: Location of the three MPA on the Senegalese coast. 
CMPA=Community-Managed MPA. (Sources: DivaGIS, GoogleEarth, 
GRDR2, DPN, IRD. Graphic by M.-C. Cormier-Salem and M. Fabre, 
UMR PALOC, IRD.) 
Government services, the DPN (National Parks Department) 
to the fore, organised consultation workshops between all the 
stakeholders in the supply chain, including the Saint Louis 
workshop in Senegal in May 2000 on the management and 
conservation of shark populations. At Nouakchott in February 
2002, a workshop on MPA as fishing regulation tools brought 
together representatives from the various stakeholder groups 
with an interest in MPA (decision-makers, MPA managers, 
NGOs, professionals, experts and scientific researchers, 
etc.) in the countries belonging to the SRFC (Sub-Regional 
Fisheries Commission). Set up in 1985, the SRFC initially 
had six members: Cape Verde, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau and Republic of Guinea, with Sierra Leone 
joining at a later date. A Regional Conservation Programme 
for Marine and Coastal Areas (PRCM3) was then launched 
under the auspices of the SRFC and with support from the 
IUCN, WI, WWF and FIBA. Its remit was to formulate action 
plans on sea turtles and sharks (Cormier-Salem, 2006b). 
2  In French, Groupe de Recherche et de Réalisation pour le Développement Rural 
(Research and Action Group for Rural Development).
3 In French, Programme Régional pour la Conservation des zones Côtières et 
Marines.
This workshop was tasked with formulating a coordinated 
strategy for the sub-region, which was submitted to the 
Council of Ministers of the SRFC in March 2003 in Dakar, and 
then presented in September 2003 in Durban (South Africa) 
at the 5th IUCN World Congress on Protected Areas. Under 
the strategic guidelines of the Environment section of NEPAD 
and the commitments made at this Congress, the Senegalese 
government created five new MPA by Presidential decree of 
4 November 2004 (see Table 1) and set up a regional network 
of MPA (RAMPAO), harnessing the experience of the PRCM 
and other joint initiatives, including the Senegal-Mauritania 
Biodiversity Project and UNESCO’s AfriMAB4 Network 
(Cormier-Salem, 2006a).
Its resolutely sub-regional strategic positioning aside, 
Senegal promoted a participatory approach very early on. 
The number of community reserves increased, although they 
had very different statuses: some were co-managed with 
the Government (through the DPN, the DEFCCS or PGCRN5), 
while others were supported by local associations such as 
Popenguine, on the Petite Côte, in partnership with the IUCN, 
and then the Senegalese NCD Association (Nature Community 
Development). In this connection, it is significant that Macky 
Sall’s government (March 2012) created a Ministry of the 
Environment and Protection of Nature with a Community 
Marine Protection Area Department, a clear indication of the 
shift in public policy.
3. You uSe The TerM “coMMunITY-
MAnAged” AreAS? froM rheTorIc To 
The reAlITY on The ground
Although the number of so-called community-managed 
reserves is steadily growing, what role does civil society 
play in their governance? How does power sharing work in 
practice? We will analyse the problems and limitations of the 
various participation methods based on three MPA in Senegal, 
chosen according to a north-south divide, from the Senegal 
Delta (Saint Louis MPA) to the Saloum Delta (Bamboung 
MPA), then to Casamance (Mangagoulack ICCA) (see Figure 
1). Although this article focuses on the internal contradictions 
of these strategies, we should also highlight on the one hand 
the avowed desire to promote innovative instruments of 
collective action and on the other the power games played 
between stakeholders that happen in all societies and extend 
beyond the framework of the MPA, revealing equal levels of 
complicity and conflict.
3.1 SAInT louIS MPA: An MPA on PAPer onlY?
Created by Presidential decree of November 2004, the Saint 
Louis MPA, covering a total area of 496 km2, is the largest in 
Senegal and responded to the need to repopulate the seabeds 
alongside one of the country’s main fishing grounds and to 
4 A network within UNESCO’s Man And Biosphere programme, focussing on 
Africa.
5 DPN: National Parks Department; DEFCC: Water, Forest, Hunting and Soil 















M.-C. Cormier-Salem Participatory governance of Marine Protected Areas:  













Ndariens in the various stages of the process, from choosing 
the MPA site to defining the management plans. However, 
significant challenges and problems specific to this complex 
region emerged when the initiative was implemented. The 
first constraint, mentioned by all the stakeholders, was the 
obvious lack of space (see Figure 3). The Guet Ndar district 
is located on a narrow sandy spit, the Barbary Spit, which 
is vulnerable to sea erosion and one of the most densely 
keep foreign trawlers away (see Figure 2). The populations 
directly affected by this MPA are an homogeneous group 
despite their different fishing methods. They are all Wolof 
who live on the island of Guet Ndar, a district of Saint Louis 
comprised solely of fishing families, known as Guet Ndariens, 
who have a deep attachment to their community and are 
bound by strong family ties. We applaud the avowed desire 
of the Government and its departments to involve the Guet 
Figure 2: The Saint Louis MPA in the Senegal River Delta Transborder Biosphere Reserve. (Sources: SIRENA Project, DPN, Landsat. Graphic 
by M.-C. Cormier-Salem and M. Fabre, UMR PALOC, IRD.)
Table 1: Overview of the Senegalese Marine Protected Areas network.
Protected areas Surface area Interest from biodiversity perspective
Somone Nature Reserve of Community Interest (RNICS), 
created in 1999. 700 ha
Highly diversified avifauna including: spoonbill,  pelican, cormorant, 
egret, curlew, sandpiper, etc. 
Palmarin Community Nature Reserve (RCP), created in 
2003. 10,430 ha
Reproduction site for sea turtles, striped hyena, jackals, monkeys, very 
important avifauna.
Bamboung Community-Managed Marine Protected Area, 
created in 2004. 7,000 ha
Spawning and feeding grounds for ichtyofauna, manatees, dolphins and 
sea turtles.
Saint Louis Marine Protected Area, created in 2004. 49,600 ha Sustainable protection and conservation of fisheries.
Cayar Marine Protected Area, created in 2004. 17,100 ha
Protection of sites of special interest for maintaining and renewing 
fishery stocks in and around the conservation area.
Joal Fadiouth Marine Protected  Area, created in 2004. 17,400 ha Spawning ground and reproduction site for sea turtles.
Abene Marine Protected Area, created in 2004. 11,900 ha Sustainable protection and conservation of fisheries.
Source: Website of the Ministry of Ecology and Protection of Nature (4 March 2013).
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populated communities in Senegal (160,000 inhabitants per 
km2). The steady increase in the number of fishermen has 
led to a high building density (traditionally there are no two-
storey houses in this district) and put growing pressure on 
fish resources against a general background of fish depletion 
and competition for access both to fishing zones, especially 
between small-scale fishermen, trawlers and shrimpers, and 
to landing stages, between fishermen, fish wholesalers and 
fish processors (Aziz, 2007; surveys carried out by the author, 
2009-2014).
The choice of the MPA site, opposite the Guet Ndar district and 
directly adjacent to the new River mouth, was contested on 
both physical and human grounds: the site was rich in shrimp 
and demersal species, but was dangerous and had become 
the only route by which canoes could put to sea. The drilling of 
the “relief canal” on the Barbary Spit in 2003 initially enabled 
fishermen to unload their catches along the banks of the 
Senegal River, sheltered from the swells, downstream of the 
bridge connecting Saint Louis island to Guet Ndar, instead 
of on the beach along the Atlantic. Subsequently, the strong 
coastal dynamics, characterised by sea erosion, particularly 
to the south of the river mouth (two new breaches occurred in 
September 2012), combined with endlessly shifting sandbanks, 
made navigation very hazardous and led to frequent canoe 
accidents (see Figure 4). The coastal and marine areas are 
steadily contracting, while Senegalese fishermen are denied 
access to the Mauritanian waters further north.
A second major constraint concerns the overlap between 
the territories of the MPA and the Barbary Spit National 
Park (PNLB) on the one hand and the Senegal River Delta 
Transborder Reserve (RBDTS) on the other, which have 
different statuses and powers. The PNLB, created in 1976, 
originally covering an area of 800 ha and increased to 2,000 
ha in 1977, stretches to the southern bank of the Senegal 
River (see Figure 2). One-fifth of its area (350 ha) overlaps 
with the MPA. Protection is integral in the PNLB, while in 
the MPA, usage and access rights vary according to zone, 
season and fishing gear. In principle, the MPA is the buffer 
zone for the Park. There is no coordinating body between the 
two protected areas, and the PNLB warden does not sit on the 
MPA management committee.
The Senegal River Delta, shared between Senegal and 
Mauritania, was added to the UNESCO MAB (Man and the 
Biosphere) list6 on 27 June 2005. However, only one-third of 
the Saint Louis MPA lies inside the RBTDS, with the remainder 
in international waters. Furthermore, the MPA is strictly 
Senegalese (see below). The status of this MPA should be 
clarified, or even revised, to ensure consistent management 
of this stretch of coast, which could form one of the three 
management units of the RBTDS (Borrini-Feyerabend & 
Hamerlynck, 2010). This overlap between protected area 
6 Inscription on such a list is the formal procedure for recognising the remarkable 
nature of an area and attributing it a protected status at an interantional level. A state 
such as Senegal has to elaborate a consistent report to justify this inscription and give 
guarantees they will respect their duties for protecting this area.
territory is exacerbated by the partitioning of management 
structures and the conflicting prerogatives of Government 
departments, notably the DPN and the Fisheries Department.
Figure 3: Guet Ndar beach and district in Saint Louis. (Photo: M.-C. 
Cormier-Salem.)
Figure 4: Dramatic coastal erosion: the village of Doun Baba Gueye 
in ruins. (Photo: M.-C. Cormier-Salem.)
A third problem concerns the random nature of the MPA 
boundaries. The rectangle delineated on the official location 
maps reveals the lack of any bio-ecological or social basis; the 
northern boundary corresponds to the Senegal-Mauritania land 
border extending straight into territorial waters. Faced with the 
impossible task of implementing the limits of the MPA, a single 
(very small) zone was marked out (not until October 2010) at the 
mouth of the river, on the southern bank, and thus in the local 
waters of the PNLB. Four markers were positioned to indicate 
the limits of the zone considered to be the richest, namely rocky 
seabeds or kher. This site was chosen based on the knowledge of 
the old fishermen; consideration of this “traditional” knowledge 
is highlighted by MPA personnel to underpin their strategy of 
participatory governance. However, strong tides caused one of 
the markers to disappear very quickly. Here again, the comments 
of the fishermen were highly critical: the markers were placed 
too close to the coast (16-22.5 km) and in a PNLB zone where 
fishing is permitted, just to the south of the new mouth of the 
Senegal River, the fishermen’s obligatory route out to sea. This 
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enabling them to reach rocky seabeds remote from the coast 
and inaccessible to trawlers) was more ambiguous. Since 
they only pass through the MPA, they had no interest in it and 
did not object to total protection of the coastal habitats, which 
would enable the seabeds to be repopulated.
3.2  The bAMboung coMMunITY-MAnAged MArIne Pro-
TecTed AreA In The SAlouM delTA: An excluSIve 
PreServe
The Saloum Delta, site of Bamboung Community-Managed 
MPA, comprises three sea inlets: Saloum to the north, 
Diombos in the centre (of which the Bamboung bolong is a 
tributary) and Bandiala to the south. In order to understand 
the distinctive nature of this MPA, it is necessary to define 
its environment as per Charles and Wilson (2009), in other 
words its socio-spatial characteristics, since this territory 
is so strongly disputed and its assets are the subject of 
contradictory claims (Cormier-Salem, 2000, 2006; Dahou & 
Abdel Wedoud, 2007; Dahou, 2008).
The first factor to consider is the heterogeneous nature of 
the rural communities and the diverse range of resource 
management strategies and practices. Schematically, 
the islands between Saloum and Diombos, which make 
up Gandoul, are inhabited by Serer Niominka, very early 
specialists in navigation and sea fishing. They are (full-
time) professional fishermen who travel long distances and 
stay in fishing stations in the Delta or outside the Delta (in 
Casamance, Guinea Bissau, etc.) for months or even years 
at a time. These islands have seen a mass exodus of young 
people, who were some of the first to attempt the hazardous 
crossing to Europe by canoe. These migrations have complex 
repercussions in terms of lineage solidarity and social and 
economic recomposition (analysis of which exceeds the scope 
of this chapter, see Dahou, 2008; Cormier-Salem et al., 2010). 
The islands between Diombos and Bandiala, Betanti and 
Niombato, are mainly inhabited by Soce, natives of Gabou 
(consequently close to the Manding) and still largely farmers 
(Cormier-Salem et al., 2010). The Rural Community of 
Toubacouta, where Bamboung MPA is located, contains large 
numbers of foreigners who have settled there over the years. 
Among them are Jola palm wine growers, Malian and Burkina 
Faso fish smokers, Lebou fishermen, Wolof traders, French 
tourist operators, etc.. Unlike Guet Ndar, the community 
includes a wide variety of “local” stakeholders, of different 
origins, activities and statuses. 
The second factor to consider is the overlap of protected areas 
that have different statuses (see Figure 5). The Saloum Delta 
National Park comprises the Fathala forest and islands and 
islets partially colonised by mangroves. When it was created 
in 1976, it covered 76 km2. In 1981 the protected area was 
extended to 180 km2 and classified as a Biosphere Reserve 
based on the UNESCO model, containing three zones (central, 
peripheral and buffer). The Saloum Delta National Park is the 
central zone of the Biosphere Reserve of the Saloum Delta 
(RBDS). The RBDS was added to the list of Ramsar sites 
in 1984. It covers an area of between 240 and 260 km2, the 
The last problem relates to a lack of understanding 
between stakeholders. Despite the avowed desire for a 
participatory approach voiced at the big awareness raising 
and information meetings organised by the Northern National 
Parks Information Office (BIPNN), a decentralised public 
body of the DPN, and the resources invested with a view to 
making campaigns sustainable (funds from WWF, FFEM7, 
FAED8, etc.), the MPA appears to have been set up hastily, 
demanding acceptance from local stakeholders without any 
true negotiation. Apart from confusion about the status of 
the various protected areas in the area (between MPA and 
National Parks in particular), the main stakeholders, namely 
canoe captains and seagoing fishermen, were the big losers 
in terms of the consultation process. This lack of participation 
by socially disadvantaged populations and those who make 
their living from the sea (often the young) was also apparent 
both at the coordination meetings prior to the creation of 
the MPA and in the management bodies, namely the annual 
general meeting and the management committee. The latter, 
set up in 2007 and chaired by a well-known old fisherman, 
had great difficulty renewing its mandate in December 
2010, as numerous conflicts relating to the legitimacy and 
representativeness of its members emerged. Furthermore, 
the lack of scientists, Government and Fisheries Department 
representatives raised questions about the committee’s 
ability to monitor and coordinate the management plans. A 
case in point was the innovatively designed artificial reefs. 
These were manufactured from sand and cement by local 
craftsmen based on traditional knowledge to attract octopus 
and shrimp, but ultimately came to be seen as a very expensive 
PR exercise devoid of any real local benefit.
Lastly, to say nothing of the problems experienced when 
implementing the initiative due to the lack of infrastructure 
and Fisheries surveillance post equipment9, the MPA caused 
heightened tensions with the Guet Ndarien community. 
According to our own surveys (2011 and 2014), the majority 
of fishermen objected to the MPA in a very tense atmosphere 
compounded by restrictions on fishing trips, a long hiatus in 
the distribution of permits allowing Senegalese fishermen to 
fish in Mauritanian waters and a rotation system for fishing 
trips (alternate days) in a bid to limit pressure on Senegalese 
waters. The opinions of the fishermen appeared to vary 
however depending on their fishing methods. According to 
Aziz (2007), driftnet and line fishermen were the most strongly 
opposed to the MPA owing to their lack of options: fishing was 
all they knew and they could only fish in the MPA. Fishermen 
using purse-seine nets did not believe the MPA was a suitable 
vehicle for managing the mobile (deep-sea) fisheries shared 
with Mauritania. They wanted access to Mauritanian waters 
and stressed the positive role of the MPA in prohibiting trawler 
access to the area in particular. The position of fishermen who 
go on long fishing trips in their ice canoes or work with fish 
collection boats (their canoes are towed by the boat owners, 
7 French Global Environment Facility (in French, Fonds Français pour 
l’Environnement Mondial).
8 Fund Supporting the Environment and Development (in French, Fonds d’Appui à 
l’Environnement et au Développement).
9 At the time of our visit, none of the surveillance post equipment was working – 
neither the radars and radios nor the patrol boat.
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as the Saint Louis MPA, the Bamboung MPA, covering an 
area of 70 km2, led to the closure of the Bamboung bolong, 
which forms the central integral protection zone of this area. 
The MPA is bounded to the north by the Diombos sea inlet, 
and to the south by the Diogaye and Kabaye forests. It was 
initiated and driven by a Senegalese marine environment 
protection association, the Oceanium Dakar, as part of the 
Narou Heuleuk project, and funded by the FFEM. The site, 
a known spawning and feeding ground for many estuarine 
species (ichtyofauna, manatees, dolphins, sea turtles), was 
chosen by a team of biologists who were also put in charge of 
monitoring it. The MPA was created following a consultation 
process involving fourteen villages in the Toubacouta Rural 
Community; from the outset the aim was to promote income-
generating activities for these villages by establishing an 
ecotourist camp, Keur Bamboung, and recruiting and training 
eco-guards and eco-guides from each village. 
Although the locally elected representatives of this villages 
clearly supported this initiative, the same could not be said 
for the population as a whole, especially the women trading in 
shellfish who believed that the fruits of the mangrove swamps 
(oysters, ark clams, yeet and Cymbium) would rot unless 
gathered; nor the Niominka fishermen from the Gandoul 
islands (villages of Bassul, Diogan, etc.) who “traditionally” 
boundaries of the protected land areas being somewhat fluid 
(Cormier-Salem, 2006). Finally, the Saloum Delta was added 
to UNESCO’s list of world heritage sites in 2011. This rush 
towards heritage preservation coincided with an overlap of 
powers between Government departments, which as in the 
case of Saint Louis, led to legitimacy conflicts, exacerbated by 
the amphibian nature of the environment. The 1962 National 
Domain Act for example transferred ownership of the marine 
environment and control of fishing activities to the DPN 
(Cormier-Salem, 2000). This also coincided with the hijacking 
and monopolisation of public funds for private purposes, as 
shown by the proliferation of tourist camps and associations, 
NGOs, management committees, beach committees, etc. and 
other operators seeking a “green” windfall. Whether one 
criticises the non-governmentality or under-administration 
of these MPA (Nguinguiri, 2003) or their “over-government” 
(Diallo, 2012), the multiplicity and incompatibility of the legal 
and regulatory references in the RBDS (Dahou & Weigel, 2005) 
or the hybridisation of the rules of access and use (Diallo, 2012), 
there can be no doubt that coordination between stakeholders 
is extremely difficult due to the large number of institutions 
involved, and the creation of a community-managed integral 
reserve like Bamboung MPA is a real challenge. 
Created by the same Presidential decree of November 2004 
Figure 5: The Bamboung Community-Managed MPA in the Biosphere Reserve in the Saloum Delta. (Sources: Directorate of Geographic and 
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Tourists are granted rights that are denied to the locals, even 
to cater for their own fish consumption (Sarr et al., 2009).
Lastly, the lack of transparency in the management of the 
MPA and in particular the unequal distribution of the camp 
profits serve to heighten tensions: following the general 
meeting held in Toubakouta in December 2013, a steering 
committee was set up to clarify the status of this MPA; the 
mandates of the management committee officers were 
renewed, with broad representation of all the stakeholders. 
This should facilitate communication between the bodies and 
make coordination easier. 
3.3 The kAwAwAnA IccA In cASAMAnce: nIMbY!
The establishment and governance of the Community 
Conserved Area (ICCA) of the Rural Community of 
Mangagoulack, known as Kawawana11, are very different 
from those of the other MPA. Kawawana was created on the 
initiative of an association of fishermen in this RC, supported 
by the American NGO CENESTA (GEF funding) and FIBA12, 
which funded the “Kawawana on the move!” study conducted 
by scientists and Oceanium, all active supporters of the 
concept of participatory biodiversity conservation (Borrinni-
Feyerabend et al., 2009a). Kawawana is an institutional 
innovation that officially recognises ancient rights of use 
and access to the bolongs and spaces of amphibian areas 
(Cormier-Salem, 1992).
It was created in 2004 by a decree of the governor of Ziguinchor 
province after a lengthy process of application for official 
recognition (the file was submitted four times). The governor 
attended the plenary session as well as visiting the various 
regional technical departments (which were permitted to have 
their say). The decree only came into force after ratification 
by the Fisheries Department. The regional council order 
establishing Kawawana made provision for the transfer of 
skills. However, Kawawana is not co-managed with the State 
and its departments: it is an independent organisation that 
carries out surveillance and ensures compliance with bans, 
but cannot apply sanctions. Some fishermen have received 
training from the Fisheries Department but are not certified; 
if they catch offenders red-handed, they have to take action 
through the officials of the Fisheries department.
The Kawawana association of fishermen had 135 members 
in 2004 and 200 in 2011. It is made up entirely of Diola 
fishermen from the Mangagoulack Rural Community, which 
includes eight villages (Boutène, Affiniam, Diattok, Tendouck, 
Boutegol, Mangagoulack, Elana and Bode) and one hamlet 
(Djilapao). It is headed by Salatou Sambou, president of the 
community association of Mangagoulack RC, who hails from 
the village of Mangagoulack.
11 KAWAWANA is the acronym for Kapoye Wafwolale Wata Nanang, a Diola expres-
sion meaning “Our heritage, for us all to preserve.” 
12 International Foundation of the Banc d’Arguin (in French, Fondation 
Internationale du Banc d’Arguin).
set up camp in this area and for whom the bolong was a 
favoured fishing location (see Figure 6). Thus, unlike the Saint 
Louis MPA, governance in Bamboung MPA is participatory 
but exclusive, i.e. solely benefiting the villages along the 
Bamboung bolong, although these villagers are not indigenous 
and do not form a homogeneous group (e.g. the village of 
Sippo includes Soce, Jola, Bambara, Wolof, many of whom are 
not indigenous but assimilated or living together in harmony). 
The “enclosure”10 of the Bamboung bolong was condemned 
by the professional Niominka fishermen, who regarded 
themselves as the only true indigenous population. Ethnic 
one-upmanship was compounded by legal one-upmanship 
(Dahou & Abdel Wedoud, 2007), as the Niominkas’ “right of 
the axe” (or first farmers) clashed with the right of the original 
Soce inhabitants. The permanent or temporary closure of the 
Bamboung bolong was a further bone of contention: apparently 
some villagers initially accepted the closure because they 
thought it would only be temporary. Others deliberately chose 
the Bamboung bolong to protect their resources and preserve 
them from outsiders, be they neighbours or foreigners. Given 
the previous and now renewed abundance of fish in this site 
following its biological rest period, there is now no question 
of re-opening it. Opening the bolong for shellfish collection is 
the only option that might be considered. 
Figure 6: Local governance, an uncertain pathway to participatory 
democracy: a bridge in the Saloum Delta. (Photo: M.-C. Cormier-
Salem.)
Another issue of a more ethical nature concerns the eco-
tourist camp at Keur Bamboung, which is based less on 
fair tourism than tourism “in” nature. The camp is not self-
managed by the villagers. The local economic benefits are 
limited, most of the few jobs it provides (around twenty in total) 
being menial positions (cooks, maids, oarsman, excluding the 
volunteer eco-guides and eco-guards who are paid at the 
end of the mission), while the estimated population of the 
fourteen peripheral villages which joined the MPA is 30,000. 
It is surprising that besides canoe and kayak excursions into 
the mangrove swamps and nature trails through the bush, the 
open air activities on offer also include recreational fishing. 
10 This very strong term, used by the president of the association of women 
who gather shellfish in one of the villages in Gandoul, condemns the land 
privatisation promoted by the Bamboung MPA. 
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to conflicts of legitimacy between Kawawana and the State 
departments. Thirdly, the personalisation of Kawawana with its 
president called into question over its longevity. Lastly, since 
the ultimate aim is to halt the mass exodus of young people, an 
age-old phenomenon that has been exacerbated by insecurity 
and several years of civil war, activities need to be diversified 
still further. Clear interest has been expressed in processing 
plants (smoking, drying), on-site marketing to promote local 
industries, one or more eco-tourist camps and, lastly, saline 
solar ponds. 
 
Figure 7: The Kawawana ICCA in Casamance. (Source: Borrini-
Feyerabend et al., 2009a, CIRAD, Google Earth, CSE. Graphic by M.-
C. Cormier-Salem and M. Fabre, UMR PALOC, IRD.)
Figure 8: Even the busana, the small dugout canoes of Casamance, 
are controlled and licensed. (Photo: M.-C. Cormier-Salem.)
Other Rural Communities (Thionk-Essil, Tiobon, Bandial, 
Petit Kassa, Tobor, etc.) are interested in adopting a similar 
approach, but there is a case for questioning whether 
transferring this model is appropriate, particularly in terms of 
territorial solidarity. Increased local recognition of territories 
and heritages could lead to partitioning, land enclosures and 
a withdrawal into communities. “Non-indigenous” people, 
ejected from community land, will have no choice but to 
restrict their fishing to “non-heritage” areas and species, 
a state of affairs aptly summed up by the widely used term 
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard). 
Unlike Bamboung, which is more or less enclosed and 
continuous, Kawawana is not a delineated area, but has been 
zoned to follow the outline of the bolongs (see Figure 7). Three 
zones were defined,  symbolised by colours (red, orange and 
yellow). Usage rights subject to varying levels of restrictions 
and ad hoc sanctions were assigned to each (ranging from 
warnings through seizure of equipment and produce to fines). 
The central yellow zone—the Tendouck bolong, an essential 
transport route between Ziguinchor and the villages of 
Boulouf—has the fewest restrictions. Fishing with outboard 
motors, fishing with non-selective or illegal equipment such as 
monofilament nets, and the gathering of green timber are all 
banned, while the transport of people and goods (timber, fish, 
etc.) and the gathering of oysters and deadwood are permitted. 
In the eastern or orange zone, the many-branched bolongs of 
the villages are an important farming area for the residents of 
the RC (timber, oysters, salt, fish). In addition to the practices 
banned in the yellow zone, it is also forbidden to sell fishing 
produce outside the villages of the RC. Only residents of the RC 
are permitted to gather and freely sell oysters and deadwood; 
foreigners are also permitted to fish subject to obtaining 
authorisation through a warden who must inform the chief of 
the village in which the fisherman intends to set up camp. The 
western or red area corresponds to the Mitij bolong, which is a 
sacred bolong where activities of any kind are strictly forbidden 
(see Figure 7).
With regard to governance, Kawawana has five bodies: the 
board of Kawawana, the general meeting of the ICCS (at which 
all categories of the Mangagoulack Rural Community are 
represented; over 150 people attended the last meeting in June 
2011), the Council of the Mangagoulack Rural Community, a 
Council of Elders and a scientific advisory committee. Decisions 
are taken by the meeting rather than the president. 
It emerged from our conversations with the association of 
fishermen and from surveys conducted outside the zone 
that at present Kawawana is a model worthy of emulation. 
Besides conserving the mangrove and its resources, it has 
improved social well-being, to the extent that there are now 
fewer conflicts between fishermen. Indeed, the rules defined 
and observed by Kawawana are even respected by fishermen 
from outside, such as those from the Batine district of Thionk-
Essyl who can come and fish in the Tendouck bolong provided 
they sell their catch to the Mangagoulack RC. Above all, since 
priority is given to local consumption, fish stocks are more 
abundant and supplying the population of the Rural Community 
is less expensive, thus resulting in a better diet for everyone.
Nevertheless, certain limits to the Kawawana model have 
been suggested: firstly, the approach is still too sectoral: 
the management plans only cover fishing and exploitation of 
the bolongs, rather than the territory as a whole, despite the 
fact that all the stakeholders are supposed to be involved 
(traders, farmers, oyster collectors, rice growers). Secondly, 
not all the stakeholders participating in the governance of 
the Mangagoulack Rural Community are involved in the 
Committee, including the people living in the villages outside 
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4. concluSIon: beTween PArTIcIPATorY 
deMocrAcY And SPATIAl InjuSTIce
Protected marine areas, regarded by some as fishery 
management tools, by others as maintenance tools for 
ecosystem services and by yet others as instruments of 
regional governance, continue to divide opinion among 
scientists, managers and decision-makers concerning 
their appropriateness. This term encompasses notions of 
effectiveness and legitimacy (ecological, economic and social) 
and has led to the promotion of “community-managed” MPA in a 
bid to make them acceptable. In fact, sustainable management 
of resources or reasonable use of the environment’s natural 
diversity is less important than local governance and the 
regulation of social relationships (Weber, 1996). As the three 
community-managed MPA in Senegal (Saint Louis, Bamboung 
and Kawawana) demonstrate, the definition of “good” 
governance is open to question. The strategies implemented 
in Senegal highlight the diverse methods used to encourage 
participation by “local” stakeholders (from coordination 
to negotiation, membership and decision-making) and the 
trajectories of governance. Apart from the limitations already 
discussed and specific to each case studied, it is clear that in 
the end, decision-making remains the prerogative of certain 
individuals, leaders or “important people” whose legitimacy 
is based on their knowledge and more importantly, on their 
religious, economic or sociopolitical power. The heightening 
of tensions (between groups and categories of stakeholders) 
and the onset of power games following the emergence of 
new stakeholders (heritage mediators) and new networks (via 
NGOs) indicate the problems associated with the transition 
from State management to local governance and explain 
the current tendency to return to centralised management 
and privatisation of resources or enclosure of land. In the 
context of developing countries (disengagement from the 
State, impoverishment and rising inequalities, difficult 
balance between global and local standards, etc.), there is a 
case for questioning the place of participatory democracy in 
public policies on regional development. We may well cast a 
critical eye over the new methods of collective action, but that 
should not stop us welcoming the innovations (technological, 
institutional, economic, legal) they bring with them and the 
mobilisation of stakeholders in new arenas. These factors 
may indeed reveal or even exacerbate conflicts, but they also 
enable knowledge to be shared, rules to be redefined and 
social connections and networks to be reactivated (Beuret & 
Cadoret, 2010; Ostrom, 2011).
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